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Disclosure measurement in the empirical accounting literature - a review 
article 
 
   
Abstract 
 
This is the first study to provide an extensive and critical review of different 
techniques used in the empirical accounting literature to measure disclosure. The 
purpose is to help future researchers to identify exemplars and to select suitable 
techniques or to develop their own techniques. It also provides in depth discussion of 
current measurement issues related to disclosure and identifies gaps in the current 
literature which future research may aim to cover.  
 
 
 Key words: disclosure measurement; voluntary disclosure; mandatory 
disclosure; financial reporting; validity; reliability. 
 3
1. Introduction 
The literature on accounting disclosure is enormous and investigates a wide 
range of issues: such as corporate disclosure practice looking at either obligatory or 
voluntary items or both; determinants of voluntary disclosure or determinants of 
compliance with regulation; the economic consequences of disclosure; financial 
analysts’ use of information etc. While many disclosure studies investigate corporate 
disclosure for private sector companies others look at the public sector and not-for-
profit organisations.  In all these studies, accounting disclosure plays a key role and 
must be measured in some way.  But disclosure is a theoretical concept that is difficult 
to measure directly1. The literature on disclosure, offers a variety of potential proxies 
that purport to measure disclosure.  
A number of prior studies have reviewed the literature focusing on individual 
measures of disclosure such as the disclosure index and content analysis techniques 
(e.g., Marston and Shrives, 1991; 1996; Jones and Shoemaker, 1994). Others have 
tried to investigate all available measures of disclosure (e.g., Healy and Palepu, 2001; 
Beattie, McInnes and Fearnley, 2004). Marston and Shrives (1991) focused on the 
measurement of disclosure via the disclosure index only.  Their 1996 paper updates 
the 1991 paper by considering a larger number of disclosure index studies. It also 
considers in more detail the theories behind the models used in the investigated 
studies to explain disclosure. The current study updates their work on the disclosure 
index and attempts to provide a comprehensive resume of commonly used measures 
of disclosure. In addition, this paper discusses measurement issues related to 
disclosure and different techniques that can be employed to assess the quality of 
inferences obtained from different measures of disclosure.  
 4
Jones and Shoemaker (1994) reviewed 68 empirical studies that used content 
analysis technique to investigate accounting, finance and taxation narratives. Content 
analysis of text can be employed using two complementary approaches with different 
objectives: thematic and syntactic2.  The review identified 36 thematic studies and 32 
syntactic studies.  It shows that the thematic studies addressed five issues: 
managements’ attitudes, correlations between narrative disclosures and financial 
reporting, prediction of key variables in tax court cases, the impact of comment letters 
in response to FASB exposure drafts, and the assessment of compliance with 
prescribed standards. Readability studies provide evidence that accounting narratives 
are difficult or very difficult to read. However, in-depth future research is needed to 
update these results because fast and continuous development in content analysis 
software and changes in the financial reporting environment have taken place since 
1994. The current review investigates the literature from another point of view, 
focusing on whether the content analysis technique employed in a particular study is 
manual or automated or both; in addition, it discusses other available techniques to 
measure disclosure. 
Another related review study is Healy and Palepu (2001) who discussed three 
proxies for voluntary disclosure used in prior studies: management forecasts, the 
Association for Investment Management and Research scores, and self-constructed 
measures (disclosure indices). However, they limit their classification to voluntary 
disclosure only. This classification omits other potential measures of disclosure 
provided in prior studies such as the existence of American Depository Receipts and 
disclosure frequency studies. The current review tries to explore measures of 
disclosure regardless types of information disclosure. 
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Beattie et al. (2004) classified proxies for disclosure quality provided in prior 
studies into subjective analysts’ ratings and semi-objective approaches. The semi-
objective approaches include: disclosure index studies, which are characterised in 
their study as a partial type of content analysis, and textual analysis.  Textual analyses 
include thematic; meaning-oriented content analysis (where the whole text is 
analysed), readability studies and linguistic analysis3. However, this approach omits a 
number of other proxies of disclosure employed in prior studies that cannot be 
classified as either subjective analysts’ ratings or semi-objective approaches such as 
the existence of American Depositary Receipts (ADR), disclosure frequency, 
management forecasts, attributes of analysts’ forecasts and many others.  
Current gaps in the literature provide a number of motivations for the current 
study. Firstly, to date there is no comprehensive study on disclosure measurement to 
date that can guide future researchers when they develop their own measures of 
disclosure or when they adopt available ones. Secondly, prior listings and 
classifications of different disclosure measurement proxies might not assist in the 
understanding or evaluation of past measures of disclosure and are not particularly 
helpful to those wishing to develop new measures of disclosure in the future since 
there is no measurement framework that can guide the analysis.  Thirdly, the issues 
surrounding the problem of measurement in the social sciences and assessment of 
measures of disclosure are rarely discussed in the accounting literature. The current 
study tries to fill these gaps in the literature. It is the first to provide an extensive 
review of measures of disclosure available in the accounting literature. It discusses 
disclosure measurements that are commonly used in the empirical accounting 
literature without restricting our analysis to a particular area of research or time. It 
also discusses how to assess the success of a measurement through reliability and 
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validity tests. Furthermore, this review discusses measurement issues inherent in the 
concept of disclosure and provides recommendations for future research to address 
current issues.     
The importance of this review is derived from the importance of studying 
accounting disclosure to researchers, professionals, market participants, companies, 
standard setters and regulatory bodies in general.  By presenting a comprehensive 
listing and critical analysis of different disclosure measures we provide new insights 
to enable future research improvements. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section (2) discusses the nature 
of disclosure.  Section (3) presents different proxies of disclosure employed in 
previous studies. These measures are generally classified into two main groups: 
proxies for disclosure that are not based on the researcher examining the original 
disclosure vehicle(s), and proxies for disclosure that depend on examining the original 
disclosure vehicle. Section (4) discusses how to assess the success of a measure of 
disclosure through the reliability and validity tests.  Section (5) provides a discussion 
of measurement issues inherent in disclosure and recommendations for future 
research. It develops a measurement framework of disclosure by either reducing the 
concept of disclosure to its components: disclosure quality and disclosure quantity or 
treating disclosure as a latent variable and finding out causal and indicator measures 
of disclosure. It also suggests how issues covered in other disciplines such as 
marketing and psychology could be taken into consideration in the accounting 
disclosure literature. Section (6) provides concluding remarks. 
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2. The nature of disclosure 
Gibbins, Richardson and Waterhouse (1990, 122) defined financial disclosure 
as any deliberate release of financial (and non-financial) information, whether 
numerical or qualitative, required or voluntary, or via formal or informal channels. 
There are different means for companies to disclose information4 such as annual 
reports, conference calls, analyst presentations, investor relations, interim reports, 
prospectuses, press releases, websites, etc. The corporate annual report is considered a 
very important official disclosure vehicle5, although on its own is not sufficient in the 
capital market context (Marston and Shrives, 1991; Epstein and Palepu, 1999; Hope, 
2003a), since other disclosure vehicles such as conference calls and interim reports 
can provide more timely disclosure. In addition, there are other sources of disclosure 
about companies’ performance including, for example, financial analysts’ reports and 
the press. 
Corporate disclosure can be divided into two broad categories, mandatory 
disclosure and voluntary disclosure. Mandatory disclosure is information revealed in 
the fulfillment of disclosure requirements of statute in the form of laws, professional 
regulations in the form of standards and the listing rules of stock exchanges. 
Voluntary disclosure is any information revealed in excess of mandatory disclosure. 
Also, voluntary disclosure can include disclosure recommended by an authoritative 
code or body such as the operating and financial review in the UK. In addition, 
disclosure can vary between firms with respect to timing (for example, annual reports 
vs. quarterly reports); items disclosed (for example, quantitative vs. qualitative 
information); and types of news (for example, good vs. bad news disclosures). 
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The importance of corporate disclosure arises from being a means of 
communication between management and outside investors and market participants in 
general. Demand for corporate disclosure arises from the information asymmetry 
problem and agency conflicts between management and outside investors (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). Enhanced corporate disclosure6 is believed to mitigate these problems 
(e.g., Healy and Palepu, 2001; Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, 2005; Lambert, Leuz 
and Verrecchia, 2007).  
The supply of corporate disclosure or the way in which information disclosure 
is managed is referred to as disclosure position by Gibbins et al. (1990).  They 
identify two dimensions to disclosure position: Ritualism and opportunism. The 
difference between these two dimensions is whether management plays an active or 
passive role in managing disclosure. Ritualism refers to uncritical adherence to 
predefined disclosure norms. It arises from internal behavioral patterns, motivated 
perhaps by an effective system of corporate governance, and not from external 
disclosure regulations. Also, signaling theory might explain this pattern of behavior. 
Opportunism is the propensity to seek firm specific advantages in the disclosure of 
financial information (Graham et al., 2005). 
Companies may benefit from providing more information to the public 
through a reduction in their cost of capital and/or an increase in the pure cash flows 
accruing to their shareholders, consequently increasing their values. However, 
providing information to the public is not a costless task. Among the costs of 
disclosure are the costs of information production and dissemination; for example the 
costs of adopting an information system to collect, process data and report 
information about the company and the costs of hiring accountants and audits, etc.  
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Moreover, competitors may make use of available information about a company to 
their own advantages; for example information about product development disclosed 
by one company may be used for the benefit of a competitor (Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 
1986; Darrough and Stoughton, 1990; Wagenhofer, 1990). Furthermore, lawsuit costs 
may be incurred when a company is sued regarding its disclosure if the information 
subsequently turns out to be erroneous (Skinner, 1994). Thus, a decision to provide 
more information to the public should, in theory, be based on a cost-benefit analysis 
although detailed estimation of all costs and benefits is difficult (Healy and Palepu, 
1993; Botosan, 2000). 
3. Proxies for disclosure 
In this section, we present measures of disclosure provided in prior studies 
classified into two approaches. The first approach includes proxies for disclosure, 
which are not directly based on examining the original disclosure vehicle(s). The 
second approach provides measures of disclosure obtained by inspecting the original 
disclosure vehicle(s).  Table (1) provides a summary for commonly used disclosure 
proxies in the accounting literature. The purpose of this preliminary classification of 
measures of disclosure is to discuss as many measures of disclosure as possible. Then 
in Section (5) we will reclassify these measures of disclosure according to our 
suggested measurement framework. 
 
<<Table 1 about here>>  
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3.1 First approach: proxies for disclosure without recourse to the 
original disclosure vehicle 
This approach includes proxies for disclosure that have been developed 
without recourse to the original disclosure vehicle(s).  These proxies give some 
inferences about corporate disclosure or the information environment7 in general and 
include disclosure surveys, the existence of American Depositary Receipts (ADR), 
attributes of analysts’ forecasts and the number of analysts following the company 
among others. 
3.1.1 Disclosure survey (questionnaires and interviews) 
This approach examines disclosure by investigating perceptions of financial 
analysts, investors or other user groups about firms’ disclosure practices through 
questionnaires or interviews.  
Perhaps the most common example of using disclosure survey is the results of 
two surveys conducted by the Financial Analysts Federation (FAF) / the Association 
for Investment Management and Research8 (AIMR) which have been used as proxies 
for disclosure quantity and quality in a number of prior studies (see, for example, 
Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Sengupta, 1998; Healy, Hutton and Palepu, 1999; Botosan 
and Plumlee, 2002). The FAF/AIMR reports provide a comprehensive measure of 
corporate disclosure practices of a number of large publicly traded companies relative 
to their industry peers. This measure of disclosure reflects the evaluations (ratings) of 
a number of leading specialist financial analysts for companies’ aggregate disclosure 
(mandatory and voluntary disclosures) within three categories: annual published and 
other required information, quarterly and other published but not required information 
and other aspects of disclosure such as investor and analyst relations. The final 
disclosure score of a particular company is calculated as a weighted average of the 
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three categories’ ratings. However, these scores are now out of date, given that they 
were discontinued in 1997 after ranking fiscal year 1995 (Core, 2001). Since then a 
number of regulatory changes have taken place in the US, which might have an 
impact on firms’ disclosure practices (Ertimur, 2007).  
Another example of a disclosure survey study is conducted by Coleman and 
Eccles (1997) who use interviews to examine disclosure. They survey the views of 
209 financial analysts and investors regarding the value of 21 different financial and 
non-financial performance measures and their perceptions about whether British 
companies in general are adequate or deficient in providing these data. They conduct 
face-to-face interviews with 102 investors and telephone interviews with 107 financial 
analysts. However, this study relies on users’ perceptions about the adequacy of 
disclosure of a number of items of information published by British companies rather 
than investigating the disclosure vehicles themselves. Results of relevance to the 
current review indicate that financial analysts have greater need of information than 
their investor counterparts. In addition the results also show some similarities between 
financial analysts and investors in the perceived importance of some financial 
measures (e.g. earnings and cash flow are found to be especially valuable when 
arriving at decisions). However, the results also highlight some differences between 
financial analysts and investors in the perceived importance of various measures of 
corporate performance especially non-financial measures.  
The 2003 World Federation of Exchanges Disclosure Survey, conducted by Carol 
Ann Frost provides another example. The survey examines systems9 for disclosure of 
information about listed companies at 52 members of the World Federation of 
Exchanges.  The purposes of the questionnaire are: to describe noteworthy features of 
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the disclosure systems; to identify recent changes in these disclosure systems; and to 
identify and interpret recent trends and emerging issues relevant to the regulated 
financial exchanges industry. The questionnaire consists of four parts. Part one takes 
the form of a disclosure “checklist” and focuses on disclosure requirements in 
offering/listing documents and annual reports. This part covers ten categories of 
information10. Each category contains between 4 and 39 items. For each item and type 
of document (offering/listing, annual report), the responding exchange is required to 
mark whether the item is required to be disclosed by the exchange or government 
regulator. Using a binary score system, mean scores are then computed for each type 
of document for each responding exchange. Part two of the survey consists of 12 
questions covering the timely, ongoing disclosure of material developments. Part 
three contains 13 questions addressing aspects of monitoring and enforcement of 
disclosure rules, and the role of exchanges in regulating disclosure. Finally, Part four 
of the survey contains five open-ended questions concerning disclosure enforcement, 
and disclosure system and regulatory changes.  
The Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) report provides another example 
of using a disclosure survey to investigate financial analysts’ perceptions about 
corporate governance at both company and country levels for hundreds of companies 
from emerging markets. The ranking covers both total and individual aspects of 
corporate governance including disclosure. The scoring of the companies is based on 
a questionnaire filled out by the CLSA analysts in each country for the companies 
they cover. Answers to the questionnaire are binary (yes/no) to reduce analyst’s 
subjectivity. Disclosure scores provided by the CLSA have been used in prior studies 
such as Krishnamurti, Šević and Šević (2005). 
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In sum, this approach uses interviews or questionnaires to reflect analysts’ (or 
other user group) perceptions about firms’ disclosure practice rather than the 
disclosure policies. It has the advantages that disclosure scores constructed are not 
labour intensive and can be obtained for a sizable sample of firms compared to other 
types of disclosure proxies such as the self-constructed disclosure index. However, 
advantages and disadvantages of using questionnaires and interviews as research 
instruments apply here (e.g., Fink, 1995; Gillham, 2000; Frazer and Lawley, 2000). 
Furthermore, the quality of design of the research instrument will affect the quality of 
the results obtained. For example poorly designed questionnaire could result in 
misleading inferences about disclosure. Furthermore, the objectivity of the views of 
the investigated user group could be questioned, given that no one can know their 
incentives to report their ratings and kind of biases that might be included (Lang, 
1999).   
3.1.2 The existence of ADR 
The ADR is used as a proxy for disclosure quality/quantity in prior studies 
(e.g., Lang et al., 2003; Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2004) because non-US firms listed 
on the US market are thought to be committed to an increased level of disclosure 
(Baek, Kang and Park, 2004). A researcher typically uses a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one if the firm has an ADR and zero otherwise to proxy for disclosure 
quality. Lang et al., (2003, 318) provide a number of explanations for why cross 
listing on the US market improves the firm's information environment: “Cross-listing 
firms (in a US stock exchange) subject themselves to (1) increased enforcement by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), (2) a more demanding litigation 
environment, and (3) enhanced disclosure and reconciliation to US generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP). In addition, cross-listing firms may face more scrutiny 
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from investors, more pressure to provide guidance than they did in their home 
markets, and increased scrutiny from their auditors.  However as convergence 
movements to International Financial Reporting Standards increase, the ADR might 
eventually lose its usefulness as a proxy of increased disclosure. 
3.1.3 Attributes of analysts’ forecasts (AAF), and the number of analysts 
following the company 
 AAF and the number of analysts following the company are also used as 
proxies for information environment (Lang et al., 2003; Irani and Karamanou, 2003).  
Prior studies suggest that having greater analyst following with more accurate 
forecasts indicates a firm with a better information environment. For example, Lang 
and Lundholm (1993) find that firms with more informative disclosures have larger 
analyst following, less dispersion in analysts’ forecasts, and less volatility in forecast 
revisions. In addition, Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that analysts' forecasts are 
more accurate for firms that disclose more. This is because expanded disclosure 
enables financial analysts to create valuable new information, such as superior 
forecasts and buy/sell recommendations, thereby increasing demand on their services 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001). However, the SEC disclosures of firms employing abusive 
earnings management procedures show evidence that managers can manipulate 
earnings toward financial analysts’ forecasts (Mulford and Comiskey, 2002). In this 
case, attributes of analysts’ forecasts might not be a good reflective measure of firms’ 
disclosure.  
3.1.4 Other proxies 
Other studies used a number of different proxies for disclosure that do not 
depend on examining the disclosure vehicle. The level of measurement varies from a 
discrete to a continuous variable and this affects the ability of the different proxies to 
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differentiate between different levels of disclosure.  On the face of it, continuous 
measures might appear to be ‘better’ than dummy variables.  However issues such as 
limitations on researcher time and problems of access to data are relevant factors in 
the choice of proxy. For example, Clarkson and Thompson (1990) use period of 
listing (continuous variable) as a proxy for firm disclosure.  Other studies such as 
Bailey, Karolyi, and Salva (2006) proxy for disclosure using a dummy variable 
(discrete variable) that takes the value of one for stocks from developed countries and 
the value of zero for stocks from emerging countries based on assumptions about the 
quality of the accounting standards employed in these countries. Another example is 
Healy et al. (1999) who use a dummy variable that takes the value of one during a 
disclosure increase period (based on analysts’ ratings of disclosure reported in the 
AIMR Reports) and zero otherwise. Other studies use an event to proxy for 
disclosure, for example Leuz and Verrecchia’s (2000) measure of increased disclosure 
is based on a switch from Germany GAAP to either IAS or US GAAP.  Bushee and 
Leuz’s (2005) proxy for mandatory disclosure is the regulatory change mandating 
Over-The-Counter Bulletin Board firms to comply with reporting requirements under 
the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.  
  3.2 Second approach: disclosure proxies based on examining the 
original disclosure vehicle 
This approach provides measures of disclosure by inspecting the original disclosure 
vehicle(s) such as annual reports, companies’ web-sites etc. Inspection of disclosure 
vehicles can be implemented by means of content analysis and the use of a disclosure 
index. Alternatively, a measure of disclosure can be constructed by counting the 
number of disclosures made by and/or about the firm such as number of conference 
calls (disclosure frequency). In addition, this approach includes other measures of 
disclosure that are developed from a disclosure vehicle such as management forecasts, 
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attributes of management forecasts, voluntary disclosure of good (bad) news and firm 
size. Firm size11 is also used in Clarkson and Satterly (1997) and Dargenidou, Mcleay 
and Raonic (2006) as a proxy for disclosure and measured by total assets in place 
prior to listing and market capitalisation respectively. Another approach is adopted by 
Bowen, Davis and Matsumoto (2002) who measure voluntary disclosure via a dummy 
variable equal to one if the quarter is a conference call quarter and zero otherwise. 
3.2.1 Content analysis 
Content analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid 
inferences from data to their context (Krippendorff, 1980, 21). Using the content 
analysis technique, the amount of information disclosed can be measured per category 
or per company by counting the data items, i.e. the number of words, the number of 
sentences, and the number of pages (see, for example, Marston and Shrives, 1991; 
Hackston and Milne, 1996).  
For the purpose of the current study, we observed two main types of content 
analysis: conceptual content analysis and relational content analysis. The conceptual 
content analysis is a research tool used to determine the existence or the frequency of 
certain key words or concepts within texts or sets of texts. In contrast, relational 
content analysis goes one step further by examining the relationships among concepts 
in a text. The former is frequently used in the disclosure literature. Content analysis 
can be partial or comprehensive.  Partial content analysis covers part of the document 
or selected items of information or key words.  Comprehensive content analysis, also 
called holistic content analysis (Beattie et al., 2004), covers the whole document.  
Content analysis can be conducted either manually or automatically or using 
both methods. A number of prior studies employ manual content analysis (e.g., 
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Hackston and Milne, 1996; Francis, Hanna and Philbrick, 1997; Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2006). One of the major limitations of manual 
content analysis is that this method is a labour-intensive data collection process, 
which inevitably restricts the sample size employed by prior studies (Beattie and 
Thomson, 2007). Therefore, the use of automated content analysis emerged in 1980s 
and it has been developing ever since with different content analysis software (e.g., 
Frazier, Ingram and Tennyson, 1984; Abrahamson and Amir, 1996; Rogers and 
Grant, 1997; Smith and Taffler, 2000; Breton and Taffler, 2001; Kothari, Li and 
Short, 2009). Other studies employ both manual and automated content analysis (e.g., 
Hussainey, Schleicher and Walker, 2003; Clatworthy and Jones, 2003; Beattie and 
Thomson, 2007).     
Automated content analysis, on one hand, enjoys a number of advantages: 
ease of use, an economic technique in terms of time, effort and money. It can be 
easily used to conduct a comprehensive content analysis and to cover sizable samples.  
On the other hand, automated content analysis is not a problem-free technique. When 
using the frequency of words or key words, one should include all possible synonyms 
and words with multiple meanings (Weber, 1990).  In addition, using words or key 
words in isolation of the meaning of the whole sentence either electronically or 
manually does not provide a sound unit of analysis (Milne and Adler, 1999; Beattie 
and Thomson, 2007) and can yield misleading results. For example, if companies give 
a note that the amount of deferred tax is not practical to measure. In this case, if 
deferred tax is one of the key words in the automated content analysis search, it will 
recognize the existence of deferred tax in this statement when in fact no information is 
provided.  The opposite could also be true as in the case of using inappropriate or 
insufficient key words which could lead to over or under estimation of disclosure 
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level. For example, Bontis (2003) search 10,000 firms for intellectual capital 
disclosures using 39 search terms and only find 74 disclosures. The list of terms is 
formulated by a panel of expert researchers. It is possible that the use of more search 
terms would have yielded more observed disclosures. This is consistent with Beattie 
and Thomson’s (2007) findings about the inferiority of using automated word search 
to examine intellectual capital (IC) disclosure where they find that using automated 
search of 105 IC terms generated 264 hits compared to 906 pieces of information 
obtained from the manual search, and 107 of these (i.e. 40%) were found to contain 
no IC content. Another drawback of automated content analysis is that different 
qualitative software has different limitations12. For example, for Nudist software, 
documents have to be in the form of text files; hence content analysis cannot be 
performed for other forms of documents like image files and PDF files. Some 
automated content analysis software is limited to English text applications only, such 
as the GI software employed by Kothari et al. (2009).  
 
3.2.2 Disclosure index 
            Disclosure indices are extensive lists of selected items, which may be 
disclosed in company report (Marston and Shrives, 1991: 195).  A disclosure index 
could include mandatory items of information and/or voluntary items of information. 
It can cover information reported in one or more disclosure vehicles such as corporate 
annual reports, interim reports, investor relations…etc. It can also cover the 
information reported by the company itself and/or others such as financial analysts 
reports. Hence, a disclosure index is a research instrument to measure the extent of 
information reported in a particular disclosure vehicle(s) by a particular entity(s) 
according to a list of selected items of information.  The first use of such an index was 
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in 1961 by Cerf and it has been used ever since. Selected exemplars include articles 
from: the 1970s [see, for example, Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Choi, 1973; Buzby, 
1974; 1975; Firth, 1979]; the 1980s  [see, for example, Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; 
Firth, 1984]; the 1990s [see, for example, Cooke, 1992; Wallace et al., 1994; Meek et 
al., 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Botosan, 1997] and the 2000s [see, for example, Depoers, 
2000; Hope, 2003a; 2003b; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; 2007; Naser and 
Nuseibeh, 2003; Ali, Ahmed and Henry, 2004; Coy and Dixon, 2004; Hassan, 
Romilly, Giorgioni and Power, 2009].  
A review of prior studies shows a great variation in the construction of a 
disclosure index. Prior studies using the disclosure index vary in terms of the degree 
of the researcher involvement in constructing the index, the type of information 
disclosure and the number of items of information included in the index.  There are 
differences in the measurement approach, the range of industries/countries covered by 
the index and other differences, which are subject to the research purpose(s), design, 
and context. For example, studies from developing countries tend to examine level of 
compliance with mandatory disclosure because of a relaxed enforcement policy 
compared to that of developed countries (e.g., Ali et al., 2004).   
The degree of the researcher involvement in constructing a disclosure index 
varies from full involvement to no involvement. Full involvement means that the 
researcher controls the entire process of constructing a disclosure index from selecting 
the items of information to be included in the index, to scoring these items. No 
involvement means that the researcher depends on available disclosure indices from 
prior studies or professional organisations. A number of prior studies use available 
disclosure indices from professional organisations as measures of disclosure level 
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(e.g., Patel, Balic and Bwakira, 2002; Ali et al., 2007; Barron, Kile and O’Keefe,  
1999; Salter, 1998; Hope, 2003a; 2003b; Bushman et al., 2004; Richardson and 
Welker, 2001; ) This include: Standard and Poor’s Transparency and Disclosure 
scores, the Securities and Exchange Commission ratings of the Management 
Discussion and Analysis disclosure, the Center for International Financial Analysis 
and Research (CIFAR) evaluations and the joint Society of Management Accountants 
of Canada / University of Quebec and Montreal disclosure scores. Between these two 
extremes, various degrees of the researcher involvement are observed (see, for 
example, Choi, 1973; Buzby, 1974; Buzby, 1975; Firth, 1979; 1984; Chow and 
Wong-Boren, 1987). Using an existing index has an advantage in that direct 
comparisons with previous research work can be made (Marston and Shrives, 1991, 
203). 
Different disclosure indices have been used in previous studies since there is 
no agreed theory on either the type or the number of items of information to be 
included in the index. The number of items of information included in disclosure 
indices in prior studies varies from a few items (Tai, Au-Yeung, Kwok and Lau, 
1990) to a few hundreds of items of information (Spero, 1979). In addition the type of 
information selected can cover mandatory disclosure (e.g., Tai et al., 1990; Ahmed 
and Nicholls, 1994; Wallace et al., 1994) or voluntary disclosure (e.g., Chow and 
Wong-Boren, 1987; Botosan, 1997; Depoers, 2000; Meek et al., 1995) or both ( e.g., 
Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Buzby, 1975; Cooke, 1992; Inchausti, 1997; Marston and 
Robson, 1997; Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003; Hassan et al., 2009).  
Items of information included in the disclosure index are often weighted. 
Weights can be assigned to different items of information either by the researcher 
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who takes into consideration the type of information (quantitative or qualitative) in 
assigning weights to different items of information (e.g., Botosan, 1997; Richardson 
and Welker, 2001) or by a relevant user group(s) through a survey.  
To summarise, the use of disclosure indices in the literature demonstrates a 
wide variety of approaches indicating the flexibility of the method.  While various 
proprietary indices exist, many researchers choose to construct their own indices to 
meet the needs of their own research. Self-constructed disclosure index studies 
generally employ small samples due to the labour-intensive data collection process. 
Giving that the type and number of items of information to be included in a self-
constructed disclosure index is subject to judgment, another potential limitation of 
using a disclosure index to measure level of disclosure is that the results are only valid 
to the extent that the index used is appropriate (Hassan et al., 2009). In addition, the 
construction of a disclosure index in studies to date does not explicitly account for the 
inter-relationships between different items of information, i.e. it does not take into 
account the incremental information content of each new item of information added to 
the index.  
3.2.3 Management forecasts 
A management forecast is a type of forward-looking information, which 
management can voluntarily provide in annual reports, interim reports or elsewhere. 
This forward-looking information could be quantitative or qualitative. For example, 
management earnings forecasts available in the First Call database can take the 
following forms: point, range, one-sided directional, or confirming statements (Hutton 
and Stocken, 2007). They can be verified through actual earnings realizations, and 
hence they enable researchers to construct variables such as management forecasts 
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accuracy. Management earnings forecasts have been used widely in the accounting 
literature as a measure of disclosure quality, in particular in US studies. This might be 
due to the availability of these data in different database such as the First Call 
database and the Dow Jones News Retrieval Service.  
Coller and Yohn (1997) use quarterly earnings forecasts including point 
estimates, range estimates, and upper and lower bound estimates disclosed by 
management to investigate issues concerning the information asymmetry in the 
market.  Ng, Tuna and Verdi (2008) argue that management forecasts offer a unique 
setting to examine whether disclosure quality affects any under reaction to news 
because they can measure forecast quality, given that forecasts vary in terms of prior 
accuracy, precision, and horizon. They use a number of attributes of management 
forecasts to proxy for disclosure such as: precision of the forecasts, prior forecast 
accuracy and whether the firm is a repeat forecaster. However management forecasts 
could be subject to earnings management which would affect the quality of 
management forecasts as a measure of disclosure. 
3.2.4 Disclosure of good (bad) news 
A number of prior studies used earnings figures to develop a measure of 
voluntary disclosure of good (bad) news (e.g., Skinner, 1994; Clarkson, Kao, and 
Richardson, 1994; Ali et al., 2007). For example, Skinner (1994) find that good news 
disclosures tended to be point or range estimates of annual earnings, and motivated by 
a desire to signal how well the firm is doing. Whereas bad news disclosures tended to 
be qualitative and related to quarterly earnings announcements and driven by a need 
to pre-empt large negative quarterly earnings surprises to avoid reputational and 
litigation costs if managers failed to disclose bad news promptly. He constructs a 
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measure of disclosure, where disclosures are classified as good/bad/no news 
depending on the differences between current earnings and expected earnings by 
investors (if not available, prior period’s earnings). Clarkson, et al. (1994) measure 
voluntary disclosure of good (bad) news by positive (negative) changes in earnings in 
the current year compared to those of previous year (or analysts’ forecasts of 
earnings).  Alternatively, a firm is classified as good news if the cumulative residuals 
from the market model for each firm over the eight-month period subsequent to the 
annual report date are larger than zero. Ali et al. (2007) use the change in earnings per 
share from that of the same quarter in the previous fiscal year, deflated by stock price 
at the beginning of the quarter as a proxy for voluntary disclosure of bad news 
(negative changes) and vice versa. 
3.2.5 Disclosure frequency 
Disclosure frequency is also used in prior accounting studies; for example, 
Lang and Lundholm (2000) use a comprehensive measure of disclosure based on all 
available public disclosure by or about each firm.  They use disclosure frequency and 
changes in disclosure frequency to proxy for the level of disclosure. Schrand and 
Verrecchia (2004) use disclosure frequency defined as the number of disclosures 
made by the firm during the 90-day period preceding the initial public offering (IPO) 
and the 90-day period following the IPO.  Brown, Hillegeist and Lo (2004) use the 
number of conference calls made by each firm as their measure of voluntary 
disclosure.  
4. Reliability and validity assessment 
In our discussion of different proxies of disclosure, we found that most prior 
studies tend to use a single measure of disclosure. Other studies use more than one 
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measure for disclosure to check the robustness of their research results. Clarkson and 
Satterly (1997) use three proxies for the quantity of information: firm size as 
measured by total assets in place prior to listing, number of articles (entries) in the 
Australian Business Index and the length of the firm's operating history prior to listing 
in years.  Another example is Ali et al. (2007) who use voluntary disclosure of bad 
news through management earnings forecasts and voluntary disclosure of corporate 
governance practices in regulatory filings as aspects of corporate disclosures.  
However, whether a study uses one or more proxies of corporate disclosure, 
and whatever the approach or scale used to develop it, it is constructed to measure a 
theoretical concept that cannot be measured directly. Hence, it is necessary to assess 
whether the measure of disclosure is a relatively reliable and valid proxy for the 
extent or quality of disclosure.  If the measure is not reliable and valid the resulting 
statistical inferences will not be meaningful. Therefore, this section discusses different 
tests of reliability and validity that can be used to assess the success of a measure of 
disclosure. 
4.1 Reliability assessment  
Reliability concerns the extent to which an experiment, test, or any measuring 
procedure yields the same results on repeated trials (Carmines and Zeller, 1991, 11). It 
concerns the ability of a measurement instrument to reproduce consistent results on 
repeated measurements (some refer to it as the stability of the measurement 
instrument over time). In terms of a disclosure index, for example, companies with the 
highest disclosure scores on a first measurement trial using a disclosure index will 
tend to be among the companies with the highest disclosure scores on repeated trials 
using the same disclosure index. The same will be true for the entire sample of 
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companies whose disclosure level is being measured via the same disclosure index.  
In addition, reliability concerns the internal consistency of a measurement instrument; 
that is the extent to which all parts of a measurement instrument are measuring the 
same thing. Thus, measures of disclosure that are subject to judgment in their 
construction, coder error, and by definition consist of different parts (items of 
information, or key words, etc) must be subject to reliability tests in order to get 
useful inferences from employing them in research.  These include for example, the 
disclosure index, manual content analysis, and automated content analysis.  
There are three common forms of reliability: test-retest, inter-coder reliability, 
and internal consistency. The test-retest measures the stability of the results obtained 
from a measurement instrument over time. In terms of content analysis, for example, 
stability can be determined when the same content is coded more than once by the 
same coder (Weber, 1990: 17). For example, Rogers and Grant (1997) conducted this 
kind of test to assess the stability of coding using content analysis. One person coded 
all reports over a four-month period of time then about 80% of these reports were 
recoded by the same person to ensure the stability of coding. Another example is 
Hussainey et al. (2003) who coded all annual reports at one time using Nudist 
software. After a short period of time, samples of these reports are recoded using the 
same software. The resulting scores yielded from the second round matched exactly 
with those from the first round, which proves the stability of the results obtained from 
the measurement instrument over time. Although, the test-retest is easy to conduct 
using automated content analysis as a research instrument to measure the extent of 
corporate disclosure, it might not be particularly relevant to manual content analysis. 
This is because of its general drawbacks13 in addition to economic factors in terms of 
time, money and effort consumed in repeated trials. 
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The correlation between the results produced by more than one coder can be 
used to assess reliability14. Inter-coder reliability refers to the extent to which content 
classification produces the same results when the same text is coded by more than one 
coder (Weber, 1990:17). The higher the correlation coefficient obtained, the higher 
the reliability of the measurement instrument. However, correlation coefficients are 
not perceived as adequate measures for inter-rater reliability unless the discrepancies 
between the coders are few or if the discrepancies have been analyzed and any 
differences have been resolved (Milne and Adler, 1999; Rogers and Grant, 1997). For 
example, Hackston and Milne (1996) performed three rounds of re-testing to compare 
the judgments of three coders as to what constituted a corporate social disclosure 
sentence to assess the reliability of their measure of disclosure level. Another example 
of testing inter-coder reliability is Hussainey et al. (2003) who calculated the 
correlation between the automated disclosure scores obtained using an automated 
content analysis and disclosure scores obtained via manual searching of a sample of 
annual reports. The result shows a high and significant correlation between the two 
measures (0.96).  In this example the coding method was different.  Other studies 
calculated the inter-coder reliability using Scott’s pi (Linsley and Shrives, 2006).  
While two coders are needed to perform this test it might be argued that having one 
well-trained coder who works consistently is also acceptable. 
The third form of reliability is internal consistency, which is considered to 
provide an excellent technique for assessing the reliability of a measurement 
instrument (Carmines and Zeller, 1991). Litwin (1995, 21) describes internal 
consistency as “an indicator of how well the different items measure the same issue. 
This is important because a group of items that purports to measure one variable 
should indeed be clearly focused on that variable”. The most popular test for internal 
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consistency15 is Cronbach’s alpha. It is a measure of inter-item correlation. Carmines 
and Zeller (1991, 48) define Cronbach’s alpha as ‘an estimate of the expected 
correlation between one test and a hypothetical alternative form containing the same 
number of items’. It reflects the homogeneity among a number of items grouped 
together to form a particular scale. It shows how well the different items complement 
each other in their measurement of different aspects of the same variable (Litwin, 
1995: 24). It can take a value from zero to one. The higher the coefficient alpha 
obtained, the higher the reliability of the scale. It takes the maximum value of one 
when the correlation between each pair of items is one. As a general rule, an alpha of 
0.8 for widely used scales is believed to indicate that the correlations are attenuated 
very little by random measurement error (Carmines and Zellner, 1991). Botosan 
(1997) and Hassan et al. (2009) used this technique as a measure of the internal 
consistency of their measures of disclosure. In addition, Botosan (1997), Hail (2002) 
and Kelton and Yang (2008) measured the correlations among the components 
(categories) of a disclosure index.  
A review of a number16 of prior studies provided in Table (2) shows that a test 
for the reliability of a proxy of disclosure has been performed only in 16 out of 50 
cases. This is consistent with Beatttie and Thomson (2007) who reported that 
reliability issues do not appear to be addressed in the majority of intellectual capital 
disclosure studies to date. However, it is possible that reliability testing was carried 
out by the researchers without being reported in the paper. Table (2) also shows that 
reliability tests have been performed mainly in studies that use proxies for disclosure 
developed by examining the original disclosure vehicle namely, disclosure index, 
content analysis and frequency of disclosure.  This type of disclosure measures 
reflects a construct which consists of a number of items grouped together to form a 
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score, hence measuring internal consistency is a necessity. In addition these measures 
are susceptible to coder error and judgment.  Some of the proxies relate to facts that 
are less susceptible to coder error and judgment.  For example, the period of listing, 
event (change of GAAP), and existence of ADR are based on facts with less room for 
coder error and judgment to be introduced.  
<insert table 2 about here> 
 
4.2 Validity assessment 
Validity is defined as ‘ the extent to which any measuring instrument measures 
what it is intended to measure’ (Carmines and Zeller, 1991, 17). There are three 
common types of validity: criterion validity, content validity and construct validity.  
Criterion validity is a measure of how well one instrument stacks up against 
another instrument or predictor (Litwin, 1995, 37). Criterion validity is assessed if 
there is a significant correlation between a measure and an external criterion. The 
higher the magnitude of the correlation coefficient, the more valid is this instrument 
or measure for this particular criterion. There are two types of criterion validity: 
concurrent validity and predictive validity. The difference between them is the time 
horizon; the concurrent validity concerns the correlation between a measure and the 
criterion at the same time, whereas the predictive validity concerns the correlation 
between a future criterion and the relevant measure. Assuming that different measures 
of disclosure should be positively correlated with one another, Botosan (1997) 
measured the correlation between her self-constructed disclosure index and each of 
the AIMR scores, the number of Wall Street Journal articles written about the firm 
and the number of analysts following the firm. Hope (2003b) compared his own 
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scoring of accounting policy disclosures against CIFAR's for a sample of 21 firms. 
Also, he compared CIFAR's overall disclosure scores with various countries' "Best 
Annual Report Awards" and with Botosan's 1997 scores. However, criterion validity 
is less likely to be used in assessing the validity of social science measures. The 
reason is that most social science measures represent theoretical concepts for which 
there are no known criterion variables to be compared (Carmines and Zeller, 1991).   
The second type of validity is content validity. Content validity is assessed 
through seeking subjective judgment from non-experts and/ or professionals, hence 
some refer to it as face validity, on how well the instrument measures what it is 
intended to measure.  However, this type of validity is always seen as insufficient to 
conclude the validity of a measure. This might be due to concerns about users’ 
perception regarding their own use of information (Dhaliwal, 1980). Six out of 50 
cases summarised in Table (2) provided a test of content validity: Hail, 2002; 
Schadewitz and Kanto, 2002; Hope, 2003a; 2003b; Clarkson et al., 2008; Kelton and 
Yang, 2008. Not surprisingly, all these six studies are disclosure index studies which 
are subject to judgment; hence the authors seek advice on the face validity of their 
measurements of disclosure. For example, Schadewitz and Kanto (2002) used an 
internal report on the views of the interest groups connected with the development of 
the Helsinki Exchanges (HE) in order to evaluate the validity of the disclosure 
indices. This report was based on interviews with representatives of the main interest 
groups (managers, bankers, analysts) connected with the HE (24 representatives from 
Finland and 13 representatives from the UK). Healy et al. (1999) used increases in 
analysts’ ratings of disclosure reported in the AIMR Reports 1980-1991 as their proxy 
for improved firm disclosure. To get some confidence on their measure of disclosure, 
they reviewed reasons for rating changes. 
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In contrast to the others, construct validity “has generalized applicability in the 
social sciences. It focuses on the extent to which a measure performs in accordance 
with theoretical expectations. Specifically, if the performance of the measure is 
consistent with theoretically derived expectations, then it is concluded that the 
measure is construct valid” (Carmines and Zeller, 1991, 27). Therefore, testing for the 
construct validity of a measure of disclosure requires a pattern of consistent findings 
with prior studies. Prior studies on disclosure have examined the relationship between 
a measure of disclosure quantity or quality and a number of company characteristics: 
company size, listing/cross listing, profitability, gearing, and others (see, for example, 
Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Choi, 1973; Buzby, 1975; Firth, 1979; Chow and Wong-
Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1992; Wallace et al., 1994; Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Meek, et 
al., 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Depoers, 2000; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; Ali et 
al.,  2004). While the results for firm size and listing/cross listing are usually 
significant among prior studies, other variables yield mixed results. The mixed results 
could relate to problems of construct validity in the disclosure index but could also 
relate to problems with model specification and the proxies used for the determinants 
of disclosure.  
Ahmed and Courtis (1999) used a meta-analysis to investigate the findings 
from 29 disclosure index studies that investigate determinants of disclosure to identify 
factors that might drive these results. The results show that the relationship between 
disclosure levels and corporate size, listing status and leverage are significant and 
positive.  No significant association between aggregate disclosure levels and 
corporate profitability and size of audit firm is found. Most importantly they 
documented that differences in results are primarily due to sampling error, differences 
in disclosure index construction, differences in definition of the explanatory variables, 
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and differences in research settings. When a hypothesis is tested in a disclosure index 
study this is an explicit test of the theory underlying the hypothesis and an implicit 
test of construct validity.  If the hypothesis does not work the theory might be wrong 
or there may be problems with the construct validity of the disclosure index or the 
proxies used for the explanatory variables. 
Construct validity is tested in 23 out of 50 selected cases reviewed in Table 
(2). Some studies explicitly test whether the disclosure proxy is validly constructed; 
e.g., Botosan, 1997; Hail, 2002; Hope, 2003a; Brown et al., 2004. Other studies test 
validity implicitly by regressing one or more determinant of disclosure such as firm 
size as a control17 variable (s) in the research model, e.g., Welker, 1995; Lang and 
Lundholm, 1996; Salter, 1998; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000.  (See Appendix 1). 
5.  Discussion and recommendations for future research 
In the previous sections we discussed the nature of disclosure, different 
proxies of disclosure developed in the empirical accounting literature and how to 
assess the success of a measure of disclosure. In this section, we discuss different 
measurement issues related to disclosure and gaps in the current literature which 
future research may aim to cover. 
When constructing or evaluating concepts and quantitative measures, a 
checklist developed by Goertz (2008) might be helpful. It suggests, among other 
things, that one must first consider the theory embodied in the concept. One should 
also consider the necessary (minimum) and sufficient (maximum) parts of the 
concept. Then one should survey plausible aggregation techniques and structural 
relationships that could be applied in a quantitative measure. Goertz (2008) also notes 
that the most common methods of aggregation are the sum and the mean.  With 
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respect to disclosure, to date, there is no general theory of disclosure which makes it 
more complex to develop or evaluate a measure of disclosure.  Scholars are invited to 
contribute to the construction of a general theory of disclosure which can guide future 
research when constructing a new measure of disclosure or evaluating an existing one. 
Disclosure is generally viewed as a latent variable18 , i.e., not amenable to be 
observed and measured directly. Therefore, we have to indirectly observe it through 
the values of an observed variable(s).   In this respect, measures of disclosure can be 
reclassified into two approaches: the first approach tries to measure disclosure by 
reducing it to its observable characteristics in order to be able to measure it. The 
second approach tries to measure disclosure by identifying some observable variables 
that are assumed to have some relationship with disclosure.  
The first approach reduces (operationalises) disclosure into two parts: 
information quality and information quantity. However, in the absence of a generally 
agreed model for disclosure quality as well as relevant and reliable techniques to 
measure it, prior studies tend to use disclosure quantity19 (e.g., Hail, 2002) as a proxy 
for disclosure quality assuming that quantity and quality are positively related, 
although quantity and quality measures may lead to different ranking for a sample of 
companies.  Core (2001) makes some suggestions on how to accomplish a measure of 
disclosure quality. However, to date there is no single measure of disclosure quality 
that attracts no criticisms (e.g., Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Brown and Hillegeist, 
2007). Botosan (2004, 291-292) suggests that quantifying the qualitative 
characteristics underlying disclosure quality is extraordinarily difficult and that it 
would be virtually impossible to employ the procedure in an empirical setting. In sum, 
the academic debate on this issue is still open and scholars are invited to review the 
 33
extensive research on construct measurement in other disciplines to obtain new 
perspectives on how to measure disclosure quality. Hence, prior studies to date tend to 
count information items provided in a disclosure vehicle (e.g. disclosure index and 
content analysis studies). One limitation of this approach is that disclosure is not 
limited to words only; it includes graphics, photos, etc. So measuring disclosure by 
merely counting the number of words or key words might not be enough. Also the 
problem of the position and presentation of information can add to the complexity of 
measuring disclosure. 
In addition, whatever the technique used to measure disclosure quantity (e.g., 
disclosure index; content analysis; disclosure frequency) the disclosure proxies 
merely rank companies relative to each other, i.e., whether a company discloses more 
or less than another one. There is no true zero point, i.e. these measures do not possess 
the characteristics of a ratio scale but at the best they only possess the characteristics 
of an interval scale.  
Furthermore, these measures do not reflect the relative usefulness of different 
items of disclosure included in the scale. Authors of prior studies are aware of this 
problem, hence some have tried to overcome (or to reduce the influence of) this 
problem by giving different weights to different items of disclosure. Weights for 
different items of information can be assigned by investigating the views of users 
(Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987). However, results obtained will be highly dependent 
on the choice of user group investigated since significant differences between the 
perceptions of different user groups about different items of information are 
documented (e.g., Coleman and Eccles, 1997; Beattie and Pratt, 2002). Also culture 
could play a key role in the perceived importance of different types of disclosure. In 
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addition, there are some concerns about user perceptions such as lack of self-insight 
regarding their own use of information and lack of consensus over the relative 
importance of different items of information among the same user group (Dhaliwal, 
1980). Alternatively, equal weights could be assigned according to the existence of 
items of information. An item takes the value of one if it exists in the investigated 
report and the value of zero if not (Cooke, 1992; Inchausti, 1997; Meek et al., 1995; 
Depoers, 2000). Some studies use mixed approaches (Choi, 1973; Chow and Wong-
Boren, 1987; Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003) and provide mixed results.  Chow and 
Wong-Boren (1987) and Robbins and Austin (1986) find similar results when they 
use both equally weighted and differently weighted disclosure indexes.  In contrast 
Naser and Nuseibeh (2003) report significant differences between the mean and 
median of scores obtained from equally weighted disclosure indices (i.e. indices 
constructed using binary scores for items of information) and scores obtained from 
weighted disclosure indices (i.e. indices constructed using users’ ratings of the same 
items of information in a mailed questionnaire) in Saudi Arabia.  
 
Alternatively, weights might be assigned by the researcher based on the 
perceived importance of different items of information. For example, Botosan (1997) 
argue that quantitative information is more important than qualitative information; 
hence she gave more weights to quantitative disclosures. This is because quantitative 
information tends to be seen as more precise and more useful and may enhance 
management’s reporting reputation and credibility.  This view gives more importance 
to financial statement information which is mainly quantitative.  However, financial 
statement information has a number of limitations: a lack of timeliness, subjectivity, 
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accounting manipulations, and its historical nature which implies a limited ability to 
convey details about future prospects and risks facing the firm. In addition, there is an 
increasing support for the importance of narrative disclosure in explaining and 
offering useful insights about quantitative measures included in the disclosure vehicle 
(e.g., Abrahamson and Amir, 1996; Rogers and Grant, 1997; Smith and Taffler, 2000; 
Clatworthy and Jones, 2003; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). For example, Smith and 
Taffler’s (2000) findings about the significant association between narrative 
disclosure in the chairman's statement and firm insolvency, reinforce the argument 
that narrative disclosures contain important information associated with the future of 
the company. Moreover Skinner’s (1994) findings show that bad news disclosure tend 
to be qualitative and timely (i.e., qualitative statements about a quarter’s earnings) and 
typically associated with large negative stock price reactions. Hence excluding or 
undervaluing this type of information could lead to potential bias in the obtained 
results. However, caution should be exercised when dealing with narrative disclosure 
as it is subject to impression management. At the end of the day, both quantitative and 
qualitative information appear to have information content (Gibbins et al., 1990).  
Another drawback is that prior studies using the disclosure index do not 
explicitly consider the incremental information content of different items of 
information included in the index.  The appropriate method of aggregation is of 
relevance here. For example, to what extent coding two different companies as having 
similar levels of disclosure could be valid, although in reality these two companies 
might have disclosed completely different sets of information within the disclosure 
index. Future research might develop an approach which can better reflect the relative 
usefulness or the incremental information content of each item of information, which 
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can be captured by means of data reduction techniques such as factor analysis and/or 
step-wise regression (Dhaliwal, 1980).  
The second approach measures disclosure through other observable variables, 
examples are the existence of American Depositary Receipts and firm size.  These 
observable variables are assumed to have some relationships with the underlying 
concept (disclosure) that needs to be measured.  
Observable variables or measures can be further classified into causal (or 
formative) variables and indicator (reflective) variables. The difference between 
causal variables and indicator variables is in the direction of causality between the 
latent variable and the observable variables (e.g., Fayers and Hand, 2002; Jarvis, 
Mackenzie and Podsakoff, 2003). If the direction of causality is from the latent 
variable to the observable variables and changes in the latent variable are 
hypothesized to cause changes in the observable variables, then these measures are 
referred to as reflective or indicator variables. If measures are hypothesized to cause 
changes in the latent variable, they are referred to as causal or formative variables. 
Jarvis et al. (2003) provide decision rules for determining whether a construct is 
causal/formative or indicator/reflective although they note that answering the 
questions may be difficult or the answers may be contradictory.  However, the use of 
econometric analysis might help here. For example Granger causality test can 
statistically detect the direction of causality (Gujarati, 2010). In the context of 
disclosure, examples of indicator variables might include disclosure surveys, financial 
analysts’ forecast attributes and number of analysts following a company. Examples 
of causal variables are firm size, cross-listing, and existence of ADRs.  It might also 
be argued that the number of analysts following a company is a causal variable if 
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analysts induce companies to disclose more information.  Hence, future research is 
invited to investigate this issue further to draw firm conclusions on what could be 
treated as causal vs. indicator variables of disclosure. Several studies in the disclosure 
literature use firm size, cross listing and ADRs as independent/predictor variables in a 
multiple regression model with another measure of disclosure such as disclosure 
index as the dependent variable20 (e.g., Buzby, 1975; Wallace et al., 1994; Inchausti; 
1997; Depoers, 2000; Lang et al., 2003) to investigate determinants of the extent of 
disclosure. 
             Jarvis et al. (2003) note that the type of indicator is important in deciding 
which type of statistical model to apply in the marketing literature.  They examine 
published papers using latent variable structural equations modeling (SEM) and 
confirmatory factor models to establish the extent of incorrectly specified constructs.  
In the disclosure literature the use of these techniques is rare (see Grüning, 2007 for 
an example) as most studies use multiple regression techniques.  If SEM gains 
popularity in the disclosure literature researchers will need to investigate the 
measurement issues raised by Fayers et al., (2002) and Jarvis et al. (2003).  Jackman 
(2008, 126) comments that ‘SEMs are essentially unheard of in American economics, 
and indeed staples of measurement modeling such as factor analysis and item-
response modeling are conspicuously absent from econometrics texts’.  The 
disclosure literature to date appears to be informed mainly by the econometrics 
approach.  One exception is Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004) who use factor 
analysis to measure corporate transparency. They construct a measure of corporate 
transparency using ten individual measures of countries’ firm-specific information 
environments using the CIFAR data base, then they reduce them using factor analysis 
to two distinct factors: financial transparency and governance transparency. These 
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two factors are subsequently used by Habib (2008) to measure corporate transparency. 
We find that researchers in the literature we have reviewed seldom construct a 
measure of disclosure from a number of observed variables. Future researchers might 
wish to consider greater use of factor analysis to measure disclosure.  
6. Concluding remarks 
This review identifies over 2521 measures for disclosure, each has its 
advantages and disadvantages and the use of a particular technique depends on the 
research purpose and context.  If the research purpose is to explain disclosure or 
differences in disclosure in a particular setting the choice of disclosure measure could 
differ from a disclosure measure in study that seeks to establish the outcomes of 
increased or enhanced disclosure.  Where disclosure is merely a control variable in a 
model a simple dummy variable might be adequate.  In the context of some emerging 
markets, there is no available disclosure index from prior studies or professional 
organisations, hence a researcher has to develop his/her own measure of disclosure 
depending on the research purpose(s), e.g., whether the study covers voluntary or 
mandatory items of disclosure.  In addition, the availability of data plays a key role in 
adopting a specific technique of disclosure measurement. For example, a large 
number of US disclosure studies use the AIMR scores because they were widely 
available for a large number of companies.  Future researchers might consider using 
more than one disclosure proxy, as a robustness check22, with appropriate sensitivity 
analysis of the results.  
In addition, an assessment of the reliability and validity of the measure of 
disclosure should be provided.  There are three common ways of assessing reliability: 
test-retest, inter-coder reliability, and internal consistency. In addition, there are three 
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common types of validity: criterion validity, content validity and construct validity. 
However, prior studies do not always test the reliability and validity of their measures 
of disclosure. We recommend that appropriate reliability and validity tests should be 
incorporated in future research in order to obtain reliable results.   
 Acknowledgements 
       We are grateful for useful comments received at the British 
Accounting Association, Scottish Area Group Conference, University of 
Glasgow, 11th September, 2008 and the 14th Financial Reporting and 
Reporting Special Interest Group annual conference, University of 
Bristol, July 2010. 
 40
Notes 
 
                                        
1 It does not possess inherent characteristics by which one can determine its intensity or quality like the capacity of a 
car (Cooke and Wallace, 1989, 51). 
2  The purpose of thematic analysis is to extract and analyze themes inherent within the message to identify trends, 
attitudes, inferences…etc. The purpose of syntactic analysis is to analyze the readability of the text. 
3 The current study excludes  readability studies and linguistic analysis. 
4 Corporate disclosure can also be directed to parties other than outside investors such as stakeholders, strategic 
investors, and strategic debt holders.  
5 Prior studies highlight the importance of the corporate annual report as a disclosure vehicle; for example, Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993 and Botosan and Plumlee, 2002 found a high and significant positive correlation between annual report 
disclosures and other forms of disclosure. Furthermore, the weights applied to the annual report disclosure by the Association for 
Investment Management and Research (AIMR) range between 40-50% of the overall disclosure scores.  This led Botosan and 
Plumlee (2002, 30) to conclude that the annual report is viewed as a particularly important form of disclosure. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that most prior research used annual reports to investigate issues relating to corporate disclosure (see, for example, 
Wallace, Naser and Mora, 1994; Meek, Roberts and Gray, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Botosan, 1997; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; 
Depoers, 2000; Hail, 2002; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Hope, 2003a; Hope, 2003b; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; 2007; 
Coy and Dixon, 2004).   
6 Finance theory predicts that more public information will enhance stock liquidity by reducing transactions costs and 
increasing the demand for shares (Merton, 1987; Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; 2000). Moreover, it predicts that firms for which 
more information is available will be perceived as less risky (Barry and Brown, 1985). This means that ceteris paribus, the rate of 
return required by investors to buy the firm’s shares will decrease; hence the firm’s cost of equity capital will decrease and firm 
value will increase. Moreover, it is argued that increased disclosure can influence firm value through pure cash flow effects by 
reducing agency costs.  Increased disclosure is expected to reduce the potential diversion of the firm’s cash flows to managers 
and controlling shareholders (Lang, Lins and Miller, 2003).  
7 Includes corporate reporting, private information acquisition and information dissemination (Lang et al., 2003). 
8 ‘In 1989 the Financial Analysts Federation (FAF) combined with the Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts (ICFA) 
to form the Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR). Thus from 1990 onwards, the corporate disclosure 
evaluations were published by the AIMR under the new title: Corporate Information Committee Report (CICR). The evaluations, 
however, are still prepared by a committee of FAF stated Sengupta (1998, footnote no.2, 460).  
9       In this survey, “disclosure system” refers to : 
• requirements for disclosure of company information imposed by stock exchange and government regulators at 
the time of listing and on a continuing basis, 
• monitoring and enforcement of disclosure requirements, and  
• stock exchange mechanisms for the dissemination of information about listed companies.  
 
10    include: identity of directors, senior management, and advisors;  offer statistics; key information, such as risk factors, 
selected financial data; company history, business overview, competitive position;  operating and financial review and prospects; 
directors and officers, including compensation and share ownership; major shareholders and related party transactions; financial 
statements; offer terms; additional information such as material contracts, exchange controls, dividend restrictions, etc. 
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11 Measures of firm size can be developed from corporate historical financial statements such as total assets and sales. 
Other measures such as market value can be developed without recourse to corporate disclosure vehicles. 
12       However improvements in software never stop. For example, new version of Nudist, called Nvivo 8 can search PDF 
files. 
13 Weber (1990, 17) stated that: ‘inconsistencies in coding constitute unreliability. These inconsistencies may stem from 
a variety of factors, including ambiguities in the coding rules, ambiguities in the text, cognitive changes within the coder, or 
simple errors, such as recording the wrong numeric code for a category. Because only one person is coding, stability is the 
weakest form of reliability’. 
14 Other measures include: Krippendorff’s alpha, Cohen’s kappa and Leigh’s lambda (see Milne and Adler, 1999, and 
references therein).  
15             Other measures of internal consistency include: split-half reliability test. 
16         Prior studies on modelling the determinants of disclosure have not been included here. The main purpose of these 
studies is to test for an association between a proxy of disclosure and a number of company characteristics.  Since this would 
overlap with construct validity measures we decided to concentrate on other types of studies using measures of disclosure for our 
summary table 
17 Since a construct validity test involves an investigation of a correlation between a measure of disclosure quantity or 
quality and a number of company characteristics and a correlation between firm size and disclosure has been confirmed in a huge 
number of prior studies, firm size is subsequently used as a control variable.  
18 For more information about different definitions and attributes of latent variables, see Bollen (2002). 
19 As well as other measures of disclosure discussed in the current research such as disclosure survey studies. 
20  The problem of endogeneity is of relevance here (see Jackson, 2008).  
21  The number of different measures identified depends on how we identify one measure as being different from 
another.  For example there are several different types of disclosure index. 
 
22  It might be argued that using two techniques to measure disclosure (as suggested in the paper) may not address a lack 
of reliability if they are both unsuitable in the first place. We agree but assuming that measures of disclosure are carefully 
constructed, one can be more confident about the results if the researcher got similar results when employing completely two 
different measures of disclosure rather then relying only on the results obtained from one measure. 
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 Table 1 Summary of disclosure proxies  
Proxy Types of variables Exemplars using the proxy 
Proxies that are not derived from a disclosure vehicle  
Disclosure survey Continuous Lang & Lundholm (1996); 
Sengupta (1998); Healy et al. 
(1999); Botosan & Plumlee 
(2002) 
Existence of ADR Discrete Lang et al.(2003); Doidge et al. 
(2004) 
Attributes of analysts’ forecasts Continuous Lang & Lundholm (1996) 
Analyst following Continuous Lang & Lundholm (1993) 
Period of listing Continuous Clarkson & Thompson (1990); 
Clarkson & Satterly (1997) 
Event (change of GAAP) Discrete  Leuz & Verrecchia (2000) 
Event (OTC reporting requirements) Discrete Bushee & Leuz (2005) 
Others 
Such as a dummy variable takes the value 
of 1 if the company from developed 
markets and 0 otherwise. 
Another example is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 during the disclosure 
increase period (based on analysts’ ratings 
of disclosure reported in the AIMR Reports 
1980-1991) and zero otherwise.  
 
 
Discrete  
 
 
 
Bailey et al. (2006); 
 
Healy et al. (1999) 
 
Proxies derived from disclosure vehicles. 
Management forecasts 
An indicator variable that takes the value of 
one if the managers make an earnings 
forecast , and zero otherwise 
Discrete Ali et al. (2007); 
Coller & Yohn (1997) 
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Proxy Nature of disclosure 
variable 
Exemplars using the proxy 
Attributes of Management forecast  
Such as:  precision of the forecasts; prior 
forecast accuracy;  whether the firm is a 
repeat forecaster 
 
Discrete Ng et al. (2008) 
Good (bad) news disclosure measured by  
positive (negative) changes in earnings per 
share.  
Continuous Skinner (1994); Clarkson et al. 
(1994); Ali et al. (2007) 
Disclosure frequency measured by 
variables such as: 
 Firms are partitioned on the basis of  the 
number of articles (entries) in the 
Australian Business Index into 
those with no articles versus those with one 
or more articles. 
 
the number of conference calls held during 
calendar quarter; 
 
 
Discrete 
 
 
Continuous 
 
 
Clarkson & Satterly (1997); 
 
 
Brown et al. (2004), 
Manual content analysis Continuous Hackston & Milne (1996); 
Francis et al. (1997) ; 
Beretta & Bozzolan (2004); 
Linsley & Shrives (2006) 
Automated content analysis Continuous Hussainey et al. (2003); Kothari 
et al. (2009); Hussainey (2004),  
Schleicher, Hussainey & Walker  
(2007) 
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Proxy Nature of disclosure 
variable 
Exemplars using the proxy 
 
Disclosure index 
 
Continuous 
 
Hundreds e.g. Depoers (2000); 
Hope (2003a); Abd-Elsalam & 
Weetman (2003; 2007); Naser & 
Nuseibeh (2003); Ali et al., 
(2004); Coy & Dixon (2004); 
Hassan et al. (2006) 
Others 
Such as firm size; 
 
Event (a dummy variable equal to one if 
the quarter is a conference call quarter and 
zero otherwise) 
 
 
Continuous 
 
Discrete 
 
 
Clarkson & Satterly (1997); 
Dargenidou et al. (2006) 
 
Bowen et al. (2002), 
 
 
 54 
 
Table (2) A review of a sample of 40 studies from 1990 to 2008 to investigate whether they have tested for the reliability and validity of 
their proxy(s) of disclosure.   
Proxy Frequency %* Reliability: 
test-retest 
 
Reliability: 
inter-coder 
reliability 
 
Reliability: 
internal 
consistency  
Validity:
content 
validity 
 
Validity: 
Construct 
validity 
 
Disclosure index 16 0.32 
 
0 2 2 6 12 
Automated content analysis 8 0.16 2 7 0 0 0 
Disclosure survey 7 0.14 0 0 0 0 3 
Disclosure frequency 4 0.08 0 1 0 0 2 
Manual content analysis 2 0.04 0 1 1 0 0 
Period of listing 2 0.04 0 0 0 0 0 
Event (change of GAAP) 2 0.04 0 0 0 0 2 
Other proxies that do not 
refer to annual reports 
2 0.04 0 0 0 0 1 
Existence of ADR 1 0.02 0 0 0 0 0 
Attributes of analysts’ 
forecasts 
1 0.02 0 0 0 0 1 
Analyst following 1 0.02 0 0 0 0 1 
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Proxy Frequency % Reliability: 
test-retest 
 
Reliability: 
inter-coder 
reliability 
 
Reliability: 
internal 
consistency  
Validity:
content 
validity 
 
Validity: 
Construct 
validity 
 
Management forecasts 1 0.02 0 0 0 0 0 
Attributes of management 
forecast  
1 0.02 0 0 0 0 0 
Good (bad) news disclosure 
in management forecasts 
1 0.02 0 0 0 0 1 
Other proxies derived from 
annual reports 
1 0.02 0 0 0 0 0 
Total* 50  2 11 3 6 23 
* Total number of studies reviewed is 40 but because some studies used two or more proxies for disclosure the total number of studies becomes 50.  
Frequency % is calculated as the percentage of the frequency of the use of the disclosure proxy to the total number of studies (40).  Studies that investigate 
determinants of disclosure have been dropped from this table their main objective will overlap with the construct validity measure. 
See Appendix 1 for details of papers included. 
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Appendix (1) Reliability and validity testing in a sample of prior studies that have been investigated in the current study. 
Reference Reliability: 
test-retest 
 
Reliability: 
inter-coder 
reliability 
 
Reliability: 
Internal consistency  
Validity: 
content 
validity  
 
Validity: 
Construct validity 
 
Explicit 
or 
Implicit 
Test 
Clarkson & Thompson 
(1990) 
0 0 0 0 0 - 
Welker (1995) 0 0 0 0 1 I 
Abrahamson& Amir (1996) 0 1 0 0 0 E 
Lang & Lundholm (1996) 0 0 0 0 1 I 
Rogers & Grant (1997) 1 1 0 0 0 E 
Botosan (1997) 0 0 1 0 1 E 
Clarkson & Satterly (1997) 0 0 0 0 0 - 
Coller & Yohn (1997) 0 0 0 0 0 - 
Francis et al. (1997) 0 0 0 0 0 - 
Sengupta  (1998) 0 0 0 0 0 - 
Salter (1998)  0 0 0 0 1 I 
Barron et al. (1999) 0 0 0 0 1 I 
Healy et al. (1999) 0 0 0 0 1 I 
Schleicher & Walker (1999) 0 0 0 0 1 I 
Bushee & Noe (2000) 0 0 0 0 1 I 
Lang & Lundholm (2000) 0 1 0 0 1 I 
Leuz & Verrecchia (2000) 0 0 0 0 1 I 
Smith & Taffler (2000) 1 1 0 0 0 E 
Richardson & Welker 
(2001) 
0 0 0 0 1 E 
Breton & Taffler (2001) 0 1 0 0 0 E 
Botosan & Plumlee (2002) 0 0 0 0 0 - 
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Reference Reliability: 
test-retest 
 
Reliability: 
inter-coder 
reliability 
 
Reliability: 
Internal consistency  
Validity: 
Content 
validity  
 
Validity: 
Construct 
validity 
 
Explicit 
or 
Implicit 
Test 
Bowen et al. (2002) 0 0 0 0 0 - 
Lundholm & Myers (2002) 0 0 0 0 0 - 
Patel et al. (2002) 0 0 0 0 0 - 
Schadewitz & Kanto  (2002) 0 0 0 1 0 - 
Hope (2003a) 0 1 0 1 1 E 
Hope (2003b) 0 1 0 1 1 E 
Clatworthy & Jones (2003) 0 1 0 0 0 E 
Hussainey et al. (2003) 0 1 0 0 0 - 
Lang et al. (2003) 0 0 0 0 1 E 
Baek et al. (2004) 0 0 0 0 0 - 
Brown et al. (2004) 0 0 0 0 1 E 
Bushee & Leuz (2005) 0 0 0 0 1 E 
Krishnamurti et al.  (2005) 0 0 0 0 0 - 
Bailey et al. (2006) 0 0 0 0 0 - 
Linsley & Shrives (2006)  0 1 1 0 0 - 
Ali et al. (2007) 0 0 0 0 1 E 
Bassett et al. (2007)  0 0 0 0 1 I 
Schleicher et al. (2007) 0 1 0 0 0 - 
Clarkson et al. (2008)  0 0 0 1 1 E 
Hodgdon et al. (2008)  0 0 0 0 1 I 
Kelton & Yang (2008)  0 0 1 1 1 E 
Ng et al. (2008)  0 0 0 0 0 - 
Kothari et al. (2009) 0 0 0 0 0 - 
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1 = evidence of test in paper, 0 = no evidence of test. Studies that performed both manual and automated content analysis such as Hussainey et al., 2003; Clatworthy 
& Jones (2003) were cited once in the tables of the current study as automated content analysis. 
E = construct validity test is explicit, I = construct validity test is implicit. 
 
 
 
